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Democratic futures at stake: Reflections from the elections in Brazil for the Possible Now movement

10 Nov 2026

Languages available:   English Português

 

This piece forms part of a series of essays about Possible Now, see the others:

 

Graciela Hopstein, Possible Now Stitching Fellow

The October 2026 elections in Brazil invite us to reflect on how it is possible to mobilize society to defend democracy, combat authoritarianism, and build alternatives toward more just futures. While Brazil and the world had already accepted, with pessimism, that the far right would return to power through the ballot box, democracy — to the surprise of many and defying all trends indicated by opinion polls — showed impressive vitality and delivered its message in the streets, on social networks, and through the vote.

To analyze the 2026 elections, it is important to recognize the presence of two completely different dynamics between the first and second rounds. The first round — in which the far-right candidate obtained the majority of votes — was marked by the progressive field’s difficulty to build a cohesive and articulated narrative.  The dominant messaging was about the future and, above all, about how the achievements and changes promoted in rights and public policies implemented since the democratization process, fit into a national project for the coming years. It was undoubtedly an apathetic campaign, characterized by a lack of voter mobilization and engagement, even among sectors historically committed to the agendas of democracy and social justice.

However, and to everyone’s surprise, the dismal result in the first round sparked an immediate reaction that began in messaging groups and quickly spread to the streets. One day after the first round, on October 5th, students from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (in Niteroi, Rio de Janeiro) organized the first street demonstration in the context of this new phase of the contest, which was followed by countless manifestations across Brazil. What occurred during the first three weeks of October was truly unprecedented, given the immense mobilization of citizens around defending democracy and opposing far-right authoritarianism. Without a doubt, the “great turnaround” was driven by resistance — the refusal to accept authoritarianism in the face of the potential regression of historically won rights. And this immense movement that began gaining ground on social networks and in the streets was not driven within the official campaign context, but rather by an active citizenry and its ability to activate and engage diverse networks and communities.

How can we explain this phenomenon? Many elements must be considered in this analysis, but the mobilization of youth and secondary and university students, particularly Gen Z — a social group that benefited from public policies ensuring access to and retention in the educational system — played a strategic role in this process. Through social media, these young people helped articulate and connect diverse networks, communities, and groups, calling on citizens to engage actively on digital platforms and take part in demonstrations across the country.

The student movement managed to spread and grow, attracting many others: women, Indigenous peoples, LGBTIQPN+ communities, peripheral neighbourhoods, influencers, independent journalists, football fan clubs and players, artists, environmentalists, cultural workers, elected candidates from the progressive field, and spontaneous groups and fandoms. They joined together in organizing the mobilization and producing content, information, memes, and music filled with humour and joy.

Without a doubt, one of the decisive factors was the creation of a WhatsApp channel — “O Exército do Lula” (“Lula’s Army”) — which ultimately engaged ten million users and was led by Congressman André Janones. It revolutionized the way political campaigns are run. It was precisely the union of these two worlds — digital message guerrilla tactics on social networks and a massive presence in the streets across various parts of the country — that drove the turnaround at the ballot box.

What can we learn from the Brazilian elections? What contributions can these reflections bring to the Possible Now movement?

Many assessments can be made and conclusions brought forward for reflection, but in this article, I will focus on a few key issues relevant to the Possible Now movement: the dispute over narratives, and the construction of a sense of belonging and community. The ideas addressed in this piece represent a starting point for the work I am developing within the context of the Possible Now Stitching Fellowship, which aims to map and analyze strategic civil society actors and dynamics in Brazil in the current political landscape.

 

Dispute over narratives and the construction of a sense of belonging and community

The construction of narratives and a sense of belonging were decisive factors in this turnaround movement in which “the impossible happened.” Indeed, the street and digital mobilizations led by the progressive field between the first and second rounds managed to establish a genuine contest over the meaning of democracy, the possibility of generating mobilizing futures, building collective desire, disputing imagination, and organizing struggle through concrete and coordinated actions. And undoubtedly, the narratives created and disseminated through various media and formats — photos, memes, videos, podcasts, interviews, social media posts, amongst others — contributed to creating and strengthening a sense of community and belonging around democracy, understood as a non-negotiable common good.

The “war of narratives” between the progressive field and the far right became evident during the recent electoral contest. As for the latter, the concept of democracy was reduced to a candidate selection system — that is, a mechanism to reach power and occupy positions within representative politics. The context of the crisis, and especially around representative democracy, has been exploited by these sectors as an opportunistic opening to construct narratives advocating the urgent need to establish a new local and global political order. Operating from the premise that the current system is terminal, they argue that it is necessary and urgent to establish alternative socio-political dynamics. As Ivana Bentes states[1], “the October battle reiterates that democracy in Brazil is a cyclical contest in which we can always fall back into brutal regimes. It became clear that coup attempts, institutional destabilization discourses, constitutional breaches, racist and sexist statements, moral panic, the use of religion for political dominance and subjugation, and algorithmic capitalism are deeply rooted in the social fabric.”

However, in this scenario, it is important to recognize that the far right effectively leveraged a sense of belonging through community-building strategies grounded in the principles of prosperity theology[2] — a paradigm guided by faith, family, and individualism, understood as a path to transforming life and social relations. Analyzing the actions of the far right in Brazil and other global contexts, it is clear that authoritarian projects can build cohesion by identifying common enemies, delegitimizing opponents, and excluding groups deemed incompatible with a given collective identity. For the far right, building communities that offer recognition and a shared narrative can acquire great relevance, especially amid social fragmentation and distrust in institutions — a context in which religious organizations and digital communication have assumed a strategic role. This worldview has broad reach and speaks directly to the real lives of large segments of the population, offering not only simple solutions to complex problems, but new forms of belonging. Appeals to violence and the promotion of hatred toward difference, marked by hostility against political minorities, and collusion with the most brutal forms of spoliation, devastation, and degradation aim to attack the existing political-social system and roll back rights, which are often portrayed as privileges. Certainly, digital communication strategies (especially those deployed on social media) based on narratives of resentment, denialism, and the massive dissemination of lies and fake news explain the rapid spread of these discourses.

In contrast to this ideology was the reclaiming of a sense of community — that is, a community life oriented toward the construction of the common good and democracy — and what progressive forces did to promote “new” forms of belonging based on solidarity, trust, Bem Viver (Good Living), recognition of differences, and the capacity to build more just futures. Without a doubt, retrieving and valuing these community dynamics was only possible due to the active presence of citizens spanning a diverse array of actors: social movements, territorial and digital networks, and identity groups that effectively connected major political issues to multiple daily experiences.

 

Communication as a strategy for mobilization and political contestation

In the weeks leading up to the second round of the presidential election, citizens created a wave of digital communication mobilization that was simultaneously coordinated and ungovernable, given its viral reach and content propagation. It was, in fact, a multitudinous, heterogeneous, and living movement whose narrative axis was not only past achievements of previous progressive governments, but also a horizon of the future. The “battle strategy” was to build a decentralized architecture for convening a diverse and broad audience—young people, women, the elderly, and various communities (traditional, artists, communicators, peripheral residents, journalists, among many others), including those with little prior experience in digital communication.

Without a doubt, the “digital guerrilla strategy” developed during the election produced a profound tactical shift in campaign communication: instead of waiting for the impact of an official institutional message, media strategy operated through colloquial language to occupy the flow that had previously favoured the far right. Indeed, what became clear during the election is that one of the core issues with digital platform communications (especially on social networks) is the lack of transparency, given that only Big Tech companies understand the “complexity of algorithm architecture”, which directly influences the viral spread of specific content and enables manipulation that favours certain groups over others. Furthermore, the proximity between Big Tech owners and right-wing politicians, both in Brazil and globally, highlighted the explicit favouring of specific candidacies and political positions.

In fact, one of the key battles waged by Brazil’s progressive field placed this issue front and centre, including through formal complaints, legal proceedings, and political campaigns challenging these inequalities — such as “Meta não se meta com o Brasil”[3] — present on digital platforms as well as in street manifestations. Without a doubt, André Janones’s successful strategy was to produce coordinated, shared action outside traditional political jargon while keeping the electoral goal in sight, matching the communication pace and tone set by the far right (scandal, anticipation, outrage, immediate response) and reversing that dynamic. It was undeniably a lightning-fast digital communication strategy that taught, in a very short time, how to “tame” Meta’s algorithm.

The idea of citizen agency and involvement through the narrative “we are the campaign” was central because it built a sense of belonging rooted in the importance of being part of a community. Supporters acted simultaneously as voters, content creators, editors, distributors, and community organizers, signalling an important shift: moving from mere “target audiences” to recognizing themselves as active protagonists of political communication.

All of this was powered by a “human algorithm,” and by the belief that together we can win and turn the tide. Indeed, when the election results were announced and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) declared President Lula the winner, joy was coupled with the feeling of collective achievement, and first-person plural expressions — “we won, we made it, we turned it around” — resonated across streets and networks alike.

 

What did we learn from the elections in Brazil?

What unfolded in the second round was so intense that we will likely need time to fully understand what occurred and develop deeper analyses and reflections. But what is certain is that the events of October cannot be reduced to a mere electoral campaign, as what emerged was a broad, diverse movement that mobilized Brazilian citizens, securing 10.4 million more votes for President Lula compared to the first round.

Considering this, it is important to emphasize that victory had many causes, not just one: hope blossomed among young people, the memory of building a democratic country was reactivated among the elderly, and fear of past authoritarianism (both recent and remote) haunted millions. Youth were undeniably key because they mobilized and inspired other audiences. One of the most moving images was the participation of the elderly: grandparents brought to polling stations by children and grandchildren, some with mobility difficulties, insisting on voting despite no legal obligation to do so. Of the nearly three million new voters in the second round, 1.4 million were 70 or older.[4] And, certainly, “there is something extraordinary in this inter-generational encounter: young people inventing language on networks that meet elderly citizens carrying memories of lives and struggles. Bodies shaped by history claiming the right to decide the future.”[5]

It is also essential to highlight President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his political and social trajectory, deeply tied to struggle, democracy, rights defense, and universal public policies that significantly benefited millions of Brazilian citizens, generating meaningful shifts in the foundational patrimonial structures of the country. Moreover, it is striking that the turnaround throughout October in Brazil occurred in a festive spirit: it was joyful, civic, artistic, and moving, demonstrating alternative ways to exercise resistance and organize struggle.

Thus, what becomes evident from analyzing the Brazilian electoral scenario is that digital environments can no longer be ignored in election campaigns. Even if some analysts argue that digital campaigns do not single-handedly determine election outcomes, it must be acknowledged that they play a structural role.

Another lesson from the Brazilian elections is that the far right operates with long-term plans, strategies, and significant investments. Although it positions itself against globalization — pejoratively labeled “globalism” — it is coordinated globally, featuring structured actions and common agendas adaptable to diverse social contexts. Thinking long-term enables the construction of robust toolkits that contribute to producing narratives and arguments for use in multiple settings and for various purposes.

In congressional elections, for instance, many of us were surprised and perplexed by the significant vote counts received by previously obscure far-right candidates, a lot of them elected on anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQI+ platforms. This phenomenon indicates that the far right has been making significant long-term investments in political infrastructure, committing resources and effort to train political cadres capable of reproducing conservative narratives and promoting hatred towards difference by attacking vulnerable groups. Indeed, their ability to organize beyond election cycles — primarily through think tanks, research centres, foundations, civil society organizations, leadership and influencer training, advocacy, and digital channels — is fundamental to building agendas, policy positions, communication strategies, and alliances with public and private actors (governments and corporations).

Revisiting the thesis presented in the paper I developed in 2025 within the context of the #ShiftThePower Fellowship[6],the conservative wave we face is a backlash from power, against advancing rights agendas (socio-environmental, racial justice, gender, and ethnicity) that have challenged the dominant political system and established social order. This is because the funding crisis facing civil society is not inherently economic nor does it stem from a scarcity of resources. On the contrary, in a context where capitalism accumulates unprecedented wealth, the core issue lies in how wealth is distributed. Therefore, the funding crisis must be understood as the result of deliberate political decisions built over time and coordinated globally. These decisions seek to weaken and demobilize social organizations and movements, restricting their capacity to act and draining strategic agendas that defend rights and strengthen democracy.

In this context, criminalizing civil society and cutting funding sources are key political strategies in the far right’s advance. In a recent article published in Folha de São Paulo shortly after the first round of elections, Donald Trump Jr. stated[7] that “since USAID was dismantled, the left has not won a single election in Latin America.” This statement reinforces a recurring far-right narrative claiming that funding programmes for civil society organizations and democracy promotion initiatives primarily benefited “leftist” groups and the progressive field.

Given this reality, reclaiming a sense of community — that is, community life focused on building the common good — becomes urgent, especially amid the systematic destruction of associative social fabric by the far right and the progressive territorial takeover by religious organizations (churches), militias, and drug trafficking.

Undoubtedly, a democratic alternative must offer forms of belonging and community association based on solidarity, trust, Bem Viver (Good Living), recognition of difference, and the ability to solve shared problems. Retrieving and valuing these community dynamics will only be possible through strengthened social organizations, movements, territorial networks, cultural initiatives, and participatory spaces that connect broad political issues to daily life.

The elections in Brazil — and recently in other Latin American countries and worldwide — indicate that we face extreme polarization, where progressive forces actively resist far-right agendas, disputing spaces, narratives, and political meanings. A key lesson here is that hate speech and regressive measures have not generated fear — “alienation, loneliness, isolation, loss, powerlessness, and distrust”, as Byung-Chul Han describes[8] — but rather resistance. This includes demonstrations defending public education in Argentina and student marches in France for decent education conditions and against the cost of living. In Serbia, the ruling party lost legislative elections to a student-led movement. In Spain, housing rights protests revived the 2008 “indignados” repertoire, while in Portugal, encampments in Lisbon and Porto denounced the housing crisis. This represents an emerging wave of protests and struggles — led by youth and student movements — that expresses not only refusal and rejection, but also the affirmation of multiple, diverse, and plural identities and ways of life, challenging the core of established power. Brazil did not experience October in isolation; it was part of a global movement, a “constellation of historical impasses and linguistic inventions.”[9]

 

From resistance to building democratic futures: Lessons for Possible Now

Based on the analysis presented, several relevant lessons emerge for thinking about Possible Now:

  • Contribute to building an articulated political ecosystem, capable not only of organizing resistance against authoritarian advances, but also of imagining, contesting, and building possible futures;
  • Promote and strengthen the construction and virality of narratives around the common, community life, democracy, and civil society, placing communication contestation at the centre;
  • Strengthen the sense of belonging and community, recognizing their power to generate their own solutions to the problems they face, a dynamic that must be considered central to systemic transformation processes;
  • Adopt a long-term perspective, investing in knowledge production, narrative construction, communication strategies, and the strengthening of organizations, participatory spaces, and community networks committed to the common good;
  • Connect political struggle to daily life experiences, strengthening social bonds and promoting spaces for dialogue, care, solidarity, and belonging that bring democratic agendas closer to the concrete needs of people and communities;
  • Place social movements, racial and gender justice, and the ethics of care at the center of building democratic futures, recognizing the leading role of collective subjects in transforming social and political relations.

Undoubtedly, these guidelines must be articulated into a common strategy. Cultural contestation without material transformation risks remaining abstract; social policy without narrative construction may struggle to generate belonging; and communication without collective organization tends to produce fleeting mobilizations. The challenge is to articulate these dimensions so that democratic alternatives gain public presence, institutional support, and transformative capacity.

In light of this scenario, we ask: which paths should we forge? Without a doubt, it is a priority and urgent to create alternatives capable of challenging the visions and dynamics established by the far right. A radically new, compelling, and real-life-grounded vision of the future requires an imagination aimed at creating new cultural logics, aesthetic wagers, and new forms of communication.

For Possible Now, the task is not merely to prevent the advance of authoritarian projects, but to build capacities to contest narratives and meanings. The central question is how to construct a democratic infrastructure capable of sustaining, over time, alternative ways of organizing collective life. Making other futures possible means transforming ideas into practices and solidarity into action, always guided by democratic values to achieve the common good.

 

By: Graciela Hopstein, Possible Now Stitching Fellow

 

[1] BENTES, Ivana. BENTES, Ivana. Campanha-Multidão: Hiper-engajamento, tecnofascismos e devir-Brasil do Mundo. Revista Cult, 30 de outubro de 2026, disponível em https://revistacult.uol.com.br/home/campanha-multidao-hiper-engajamento-tecnofascismos-e-devir-brasil-do-mundo. (Translated title “Crowd Campaign: Hyper-engagement, techno-fascisms, and the becoming-Brazil of the world.”)

[2] Prosperity theology is a religious doctrine that holds that material wealth and physical health are God’s will and can be attained through faith, positive confession, and financial contributions in the form of donations (tithes and offerings).

[3] It is a play on words that could be translated as: “Meta, don’t mess with Brazil.”

[4] The mobilization of elder voters helped lower the abstention rate, which fell from 21.08% in the first round to 19.21% in the second.

[5] BENTES, Ivana, op. cit., 2026.

[6] HOPSTEIN, Graciela. “The Crisis of Democracy and Civil Society: Challenges and Perspectives in the Context of the Shift the Power Movement.” Available at: https://globalfundcommunityfoundations.org/blog/crisis-of-democracy-and-civil-society/

[7] MENON, Isabella. Filho de Trump diz que corte em ONGs faz esquerda perder eleições na América Latina. Folha de São Paulo, São Paulo, 5 out. 2026. Disponível em: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2026/10/filho-de-trump-diz-que-corte-em-ongs-faz-esquerda-perder-eleicoes-na-america-latina.shtml?pwgt=l0mr3hxgb4zcp3b8wxczdvppdz6m

(Translated title “Trump’s Son Says Cuts to NGOs Make the Left Lose Elections in Latin America)

[8] HAN, Byung-Chul. O espírito da esperança: contra a sociedade do medo. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes, 2024. (Translated title: The Spirit of Hope: Against the Society of Fear)

[9] BENTES, Ivana, op. cit., 2026.

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